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A computational theory of consciousness should include a quantitative measure of
consciousness, or MoC, that (i) would reveal to what extent a given system is conscious,
(ii) would make it possible to compare not only different systems, but also the same
system at different times, and (iii) would be graded, because so is consciousness.
However, unless its design is properly constrained, such an MoC gives rise to what we
call the boundary problem: an MoC that labels a system as conscious will do so for
some—perhaps most—of its subsystems, as well as for irrelevantly extended systems
(e.g., the original system augmented with physical appendages that contribute nothing to
the properties supposedly supporting consciousness), and for aggregates of individually
conscious systems (e.g., groups of people). This problem suggests that the properties
that are being measured are epiphenomenal to consciousness, or else it implies a bizarre
proliferation of minds. We propose that a solution to the boundary problem can be found
by identifying properties that are intrinsic or systemic: properties that clearly differentiate
between systems whose existence is a matter of fact, as opposed to those whose
existence is a matter of interpretation (in the eye of the beholder). We argue that if a
putative MoC can be shown to be systemic, this ipso facto resolves any associated
boundary issues. As test cases, we analyze two recent theories of consciousness in
light of our definitions: the Integrated Information Theory and the Geometric Theory of
consciousness.
Keywords: consciousness, open dynamical system, brain dynamics, integrated information, representational
capacity, trajectory space, systemic properties, intrinsic
INTRODUCTION
Computational theories of consciousness (CTCs; e.g., Fekete and Edelman, 2011; Oizumi et al.,
2014) attempt to answer the question of how physical systems give rise to phenomenal experience
by appealing to the computational structure of their dynamics. CTCs typically adopt a very
abstract perspective on this problem, and hence restrict themselves to minimal assumptions about
phenomenal states (and therefore about conscious states in general)1. Prima facie this perspective
1For this reason, in the present paper we refrain from taking up many of the theoretical distinctions that can be found in the
literature, such as the one between “intransitive” and “transitive” consciousness—a distinction that is not made by either of
the two theories that we address in depth, the Integrated Information Theory (Oizumi et al., 2014) and the Geometric Theory
(Fekete and Edelman, 2011); see Sections Tononi’s IIT: Is Integrated Conceptual Information A Systemic Property? and The
Geometric Theory Revisited.
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lends itself to understanding not only human consciousness and
its relation to neural dynamics, but also animal consciousness, as
well as the possibility of artificial consciousness.
One of the key observations regarding phenomenal experience
is that it appears to be graded: not only can otherwise active
brains fail to give rise to experience at all (e.g., under anesthesia),
but, moreover, the richness of our experience varies greatly
over time. Our growing understanding of complex systems
theory suggests that this is not a coincidental feature of human
consciousness, or even of neuronally based experience in general,
but rather an expected one: by systematically varying the
composition of a system (model) realizing certain dynamics
and/or the parameters that control its activity, it is typically
possible to degrade and otherwise vary the salient computational
properties that the system exhibits. Consequently, as CTCs
are founded on the notion that what makes for phenomenal
experience is the realization of computational properties, it
follows that graded experience is an all but inescapable feature
of CTCs.
It is therefore unsurprising that CTCs typically imply the
possibility to measure the extent to which given dynamics
realize phenomenally rich content, and go as far as suggesting
measures of consciousness (MoCs): real-valued functions defined
on the system’s dynamics, whose output is designed to vary
monotonically with richness or “degree” of consciousness. This
is roughly equivalent to quantifying the extent to which a
model realizes the computational properties that are assumed
to underlie phenomenality. Ideally, an MoC should support
fine-scale and clearly interpretable comparison between different
regimes under which the same system (model) can operate, as
well as the comparison of systems that differ in their composition.
Such an MoC whose results can be expressed in standardized
units would be universal, in that it would apply to any physical
system and would provide a metric to compare and rank
systems—a “consciousness detector.”
The theoretical appeal of MoCs is clear: they offer a principled
means of answering highly contested questions such as the extent
of consciousness in living organisms (are cats conscious? are
slugs? is a nervous system necessary for having experience?),
rather than simply affirming our preconceived notions as to the
place of experience in nature. An MoC that would apply at least
to primate brains would also have a great practical significance.
Consider for example intraoperative awareness, affecting about
one in a thousand people under anesthesia (American Society
of Anesthesiologists Task Force on Intraoperative Awareness,
2006), who unfortunately have some experience of undergoing
a surgical procedure. This experience may vary from dim and
fragmented to quite vivid, and can be very traumatic and
lead to debilitating post-traumatic symptoms. To minimize
intraoperative awareness, BIS (bispectral index) machines are
often used. A BIS machine monitors EEG signals, ranking
them on a scale from 0 to a 100 (denoting, respectively,
EEG silence and full-fledged alertness), with levels of 40–60
supposedly indicating sufficient levels of anesthesia, that is,
absence of consciousness. Thus, in effect the BIS is an MoC,
albeit not a theory-driven one, but simply a result of data fitting
(the exact details of BIS machines are not disclosed by their
manufacturers).
Clearly, a theory-driven MoC must do better than such crude
measures. Indeed, it is hard to see how a theory of consciousness
could be considered complete without specifying a universal
MoC. Doing so, however, is not an easy undertaking. Here we
state and discuss a cluster of problems arising from the notion of
anMoC. Specifically, the following are all aspects of what we refer
to as the boundary problem:
1. An MoC indicating that a given system is conscious will do so
for (at least some) subsystems of that system. We call this the
system/subsystem problem.
2. An MoC indicating that a system is conscious will do so
also for the same system augmented with some extraneous
elements. We call this the embodiment problem.
3. An arbitrary conjunction of systems that an MoC labels as
conscious would also be accounted conscious. We call this the
hive mind problem.
The reliance on an MoC thus gives rise to a situation in which
declaring a system to be conscious forces us to admit the same
for a multitude of other systems, many of which are virtually
identical to it.
It is important to note that this problem extends to any
computational theory of experience—an MoC is, after all,
nothing more than a clear articulation of the computational
property that realizes graded experience. A viable CTC must
thus include an explanation of what it is that makes a system
different from the set of its parts, as well as what constitutes
the boundary that separates it from other systems. This is
by no means a contrived or purely theoretical problem: the
usefulness of a CTC and of an MoC that accompanies it
depends entirely on how convincing it is when applied to
real-life situations ranging from anesthesia, through presence
of consciousness in brain-damaged patients (e.g., locked-
in states), to theoretically interesting questions regarding
consciousness in split brains, computers, and alien life forms,
as well as questions regarding the necessity of embodiment for
consciousness.
These observations leave us with several options. We could
take the aforementioned problems as an indication that an MoC
is not possible. This choice effectively gives up on the possibility
of developing a computational theory of consciousness—an
unappealing prospect, given how pervasive and successful the
computational approach is in relation to all other aspects of the
mind/brain (for a review see Edelman, 2008). Alternatively, we
could bite the bullet and accept the consequences, including the
bizarre proliferation of minds implied by the system/subsystem
and the hive mind problems. This stance not only would be
lacking in theoretical parsimony, but would also be overly
bold: all our intuition and all the data we have suggest that
consciousness arises exclusively in single-embodied, indivisible
minds.
The remaining option is to impose additional constraints on
the application of MoCs. For instance, one could try to show
that applying an MoC to a given substrate (putative system
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or set of systems) results in quantitative differences between
single- and multiple-mind scenarios. A more ambitious goal
would be to show that the difference between such cases is
qualitative.
In the remainder of the paper, we discuss the possibilities
for developing MoCs that would result in such quantitative
or qualitative distinctions. In Section Model selection, The
Boundary Problem, and Inter-Theory Convergence, we focus on
the former, by considering whether it makes sense to employ
some sort of model selection criterion, with the aim to show
that the results of MoC analysis are best explained by a single
mind when applied to a healthy awake person, and conversely
by two or more when applied, for instance, to a split brain
(if this is indeed the case). In the subsequent sections, we
explore the possibility of making a qualitative distinction, by
identifying a family of properties of open dynamical systems—
systems of elements whose behavior is determined through
mutual interaction and concurrent external influences—that
single out wholes rather than parts or aggregates. To that end, in
Section Implementation and the Boundary Problem we analyze
the concept of implementation.
The notion of implementation—what it means for a
system to implement a computation—has long been considered
insufficiently constrained (Putnam, 1988), casting doubt on its
value as an explanatory device in understanding the mind. At
the same time, any quantitative theory in physics rests on the
concept of implementation (of the laws of physics, by a given
system), which implies that implementation is not conceptually
problematic as such. This observation suggests that our focus
should be on capturing the exact sense in which implementation
is problematic insofar as experience is concerned.
To begin with, we note that any account purporting to explain
experiencemust be intrinsic: the experience of a system cannot be
a matter of interpretation by an external observer (Balduzzi and
Tononi, 2008; Fekete and Edelman, 2011; Oizumi et al., 2014).
Of course, for a property (or a description) to be independent
of external points of view (other possible descriptions) does not
necessitate that it have any first-person aspects. We contend
however, that the converse must be true: that the encapsulated
nature of experience can only arise through instantiation of
intrinsic physical properties. Consequently we wish to spell out
the constraints that must be satisfied for a CTC to be independent
of an external points of view—a running theme for the rest of
the discussion. To this end we discuss what it means for certain
computational properties to be intrinsically realized.
Accordingly, in Section The Boundary Problem and Systemic
Properties, we proceed to analyze the relationships between
systems (wholes) and subsystems (parts). In particular, we offer
an analysis in terms of dynamical systems of the situations in
which “the whole is greater than the sum of its parts” (Aristotle,
Metaphysics H) and suggest that a better formulation for the case
of MoCs would be “the whole is different from the sum of its
parts.” This leads to the notion of systemic properties—properties
thatmake it possible to state the conditions under which a system,
over and above the set of its parts, exists intrinsically and is not
merely as a matter of attribution. We show how an appeal to such
properties can make a CTC immune to the boundary problem
and consider whether or not they could serve as a naturalistic way
of modeling the unity of consciousness.
In Sections Tononi’s IIT: Is Integrated Conceptual
Information a Systemic Property? and The Geometric Theory
Revisited, we apply these conceptual tools to two computational
theories of consciousness: the Integrated Information Theory
of Tononi (Oizumi et al., 2014) and the Geometric Theory of
Fekete and Edelman (2011, 2012). Doing so reveals some of
the strengths and weaknesses of the two theories, not only in
dealing with boundary issues, but also, just as importantly, in
how intrinsic they are in the above sense, and how they relate to
the notion of the unity of consciousness2.
MODEL SELECTION, THE BOUNDARY
PROBLEM, AND INTER-THEORY
CONVERGENCE
One of the critical determinants of the success of mathematical
models of physical phenomena is the numerical correspondence
between measured and predicted quantities. All things being
equal, if one model is more accurate than another, we consider it
to be closer to “the truth.” In technical terms, such models strike
an optimal balance (according to some predefined criterion)
between goodness of fit (how well the model explains existing
data) and predictive ability. The process of establishing which
of several models is preferable in this sense is referred to as
model selection. Unfortunately, considerations of goodness of
fit/predictive ability (for the conjunction of which we will use the
shorthand adequate fit in what follows) do not appear particularly
informative in the computational modeling of consciousness: we
can imagine a highly accurate model of brain dynamics which
nevertheless offers no insight into the consciousness (or the lack
thereof) associated with that dynamics.
However, this is not to say that a CTC is exempt from adequate
fit requirements pertaining to the underlying dynamics: after all,
it is the dynamics of a system that gives rise to experience. It is
therefore important to recognize that an MoC is an additional
piece of explanatory machinery, which complements a model of
the pertinent (say, brain) dynamics. In particular, a successful
MoC could help us evaluate the specifics (such as the equations
or the range of parameters) of a model of brain dynamics, so as to
focus on a particular, perhaps optimal, level of detail (e.g., neuron
vs. membrane compartment or Brodmann area). Alternatively,
it could help establish that only a multiscale approach will do, a
notion that we revisit below.
Let us try to understand what adequate fit could mean when
applied to an MoC. Insofar as the fit between model and data is
concerned, we must recognize several types of convergence. First,
there is inter-model convergence, which quantifies how well the
model in question performs in accounting for the phenomena
of interest (as compared to other possible models and in
general). Second, there is intra-model convergence: horizontal,
which involves fitting the parameters of a model such that it
best explains data, and, less obviously, vertical, which involves
2This is not to be confused with the experience of unity (Welshon, 2013; van
Leeuwen, 2015; and see Section Discussion).
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choosing the composition of the model. Regarding the latter,
suppose that we have an agreed-upon framework for modeling
a phenomenon (e.g., consciousness) and suitable methods for
fitting/discovering parameters; this still leaves open the question
of whether or not themodel encompasses the optimal (in terms of
goodness of fit/predictive ability) or correct (in some other sense)
complement of constituents, from among the set of all potentially
relevant ones. This is the boundary problem introduced
above.
Within vertical convergence a further distinction should be
made, which gives rise to distinct aspects of the boundary
problem, between upward and downward convergence. Upward
convergence is what happens when achieving a more adequate
fit requires adding elements to the putative system that is being
singled out. Thus, we can ask whether or not an embodied brain
is better suited for modeling consciousness than a disembodied
one (as in the case of a brain in a vat), as well as whether
or not a hive mind is more conscious than a single-brain
one. Conversely, downward convergence is what happens when
elements must be left out of the description of the system
to achieve a more adequate fit, as in the system/subsystem
problem.
What we need, then, is a mechanism for exploring the vertical
convergence of an MoC. Unfortunately, best fit between a mind
and its model is not quite practical as a criterion, because a mind
cannot be accessed directly “from the outside.” For example, even
if we had an MoC that predicts the level of awareness under
anesthesia, its evaluation would still have to rely on querying the
subject in the awake state. Apart from the usual problems of noise
stemming from the questionnaire approach being necessarily
indirect, such a measurement would be temporally displaced
relative to the state that it is intended to assess. Furthermore, it
is hard to see how it could generate data regarding the proper
level (if any) for modeling brain dynamics, the contribution of a
particular part of the brain such as the cerebellum or the basal
ganglia (say) to consciousness, or the emergence of two minds in
a split brain.
Still, if we do have an MoC that fits these limited data well and
is meaningful from a theoretical point of view (e.g., according to
IIT), using it to search for “hotspots” might help us resolve some
of the above boundary problems. To do so, the MoC should be
applied to the power set of all the elements of the putative system
(e.g., physiological measurements derived from the brain and the
body), with the exception of subsets for which the MoC is not
defined (such as singletons in the case of a relational ensemble-
based MoC). Thus, for example, if the MoC consistently yields
higher values across subjects when applied jointly to cortical and
cerebellar measurements (compared to the cortical measurement
alone), then there would be a good reason to claim that the
cerebellum contributes to consciousness. Similarly, if hotspot
analysis of a split brain indicates a bifurcation, it would support
the notion of two emergentminds whereas a single hotspot would
support the converse (see Figure 1).
However, aside from being limited as already mentioned,
hotspot analysis is clearly ad hoc. In particular, given that direct
empirical verification of an MoC is inherently problematic, we
would understandably be wary of trusting such analyses in
scenarios that go beyond what we are familiar and comfortable
with. Instead, we propose to raise the stakes, by seeking to
identify “dynamical” properties—by which we mean properties
of a set of equations describing a collection of elements and
their interactions—that characterize “entire” systems but not
their parts. To do so, we first discuss what it means for a system
to implement a set of equations, that is, to realize a certain
dynamics.
IMPLEMENTATION AND THE BOUNDARY
PROBLEM
We shall now offer several observations regarding the notion of
implementation: a physical system realizing a formal structure
through its dynamics, that is, the causal (endogenous and/or
environmental) factors that steer it. To take on the boundary
problem inherent in the relationship between a system and its
subsystems, we need to understand the interaction between their
respective dynamics. We propose to do so by stating what it
means for a subsystem to operate “on its own.” Roughly, this
amounts to whether or not a subsystem implements a dynamics
that is different (in a sense that we shall define) when considered
separately from the broader context of the rest of the elements
that comprise the entire system.
In the following discussion of implementation, we adopt
the notion of minimal computationalism (Chalmers, 2011).
Accordingly, where possible we avoid specifying whether the
implementation in question is discrete (digital) or continuous
(analog), as the two theories to be discussed later as test cases
differ in this regard. Because we are interested in the modeling
of physical systems that change over time according to a lawful
relation, we use the term dynamical system. Simply put, a
physical substrate is said to implement a dynamical system
specified by a formal model if (i) there is a bijective mapping
between the elements of the model and the elements of the
putative physical system; (ii) there is a bijective mapping between
the states of each formal element and those of its physical
counterpart; and (iii) given these mappings, the transition rules
in both domains are isomorphic (which is to say that the
causal structure of the physical substrate exactly corresponds
to the transition rules of the abstract model, including all
the necessary counterfactual stipulations established through
measurement)3.
We are interested in systems that can be, in constant
interaction with their surroundings, given that normally awake
organisms, our paradigmatic example of consciousness, are.
Such systems are referred to as open dynamical systems,
and accordingly we need to modify the above definition by
separating the state of the system at a point in time into several
components: inputs, internal state, and parameters, where inputs
correspond to concurrent streams of external perturbations to
3 This is to say that the total state of the system at a given time uniquely determines
its next state T(t)⇒ T(t +△t) (representing an input-output matching, or “strong
conditionals” in the language of Chalmers, 1996), or that the conjunction of
internal state (and parameters) and input uniquely and invariably determines the
subsequent internal state.
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FIGURE 1 | Hot spot analysis (HsA). In HsA, an MoC is applied to different subsets of an array of measurements/elements in model. (A–D) A depiction of a normal
brain (left) and a split brain (right) modeled as a set of elements and their connections. (A) For the normal brain the MoC gives a maximal value for a collection of
elements spanning most of the brain. (B) In a split brain the same set of elements as in (A) gives a much lower, and non-maximal reading. (C) For the normal brain the
maximal MoC reading in each hemisphere taken on its own is smaller than the maximal reading obtained from the whole brain network. (D) The opposite of (C) is true
for the split brain: the maximal MoC readings are for two disparate networks each spanning most of a single hemisphere.
the system4, and parameters are aspects of the system or of its
immediate surroundings that express themselves in the transition
rules. In accordance with common terminology, we refer to
initial conditions as the parameters and internal state at the
start of the period of time during which the system is being
analyzed.
4Note that both “inputs” in the classical sense, that is, energy transduced by
receptors, as well as various types of noise, fall under this description: both can
be expressed as terms in the system equations shaping the system’s future state. In
the brain, in particular, the former sense seems to apply only to a small fraction of
the cells, while the latter seems to be prevalent at all levels. In the final section, we
will return to the implication of this fact for our notion of implementation.
The question whether or not a system implements a given
dynamics can only be answered if all the possible behaviors of
the system are considered (this naturally includes all possible
inputs and initial states). Another way of stating this observation
is by appealing to the concept of the space of trajectories. If
the instantaneous state of a system is thought of as a vector, a
trajectory of the system is a sequence of such vectors ordered
in time5. The trajectory space is then the space of all possible
trajectories (behaviors) of the system. To state the obvious, not
5In systems with time-continuous dynamics, this is a closed interval rather than an
ordered set of points in the high-dimensional state space.
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only does an implementation uniquely determine a trajectory
space, but two systems that give rise to two different6 trajectory
spaces necessarily implement different dynamics. Given that we
are interested in models of experience, we have in mind spaces
comprising trajectories of definite duration (e.g., 100ms, 1 s, and
so on), or several such durations where multi-scale analysis is
considered.
It seems intuitively clear enough a statement, that
implementation can only be fully understood and evaluated in
light of all possible combinations of input sequences and initial
internal states. Yet, there is more than one way to construe
the phrase “all possible” here. For instance, one may opt for
logical possibility, which, assuming that inputs and initial
conditions are encoded as arrays of numbers, implies varying
their values combinatorially and exhaustively. This, however,
may not be viable, due to physical limitations that single out
admissible initial conditions: elements can only take bounded
values (typically nonzero values and a maximal value bound),
and there often are mutual dependencies among elements, ruling
out various logically possible conjunctions of element states.
Similar considerations restrict the range of admissible inputs and
parameter values. Furthermore, in certain scenarios the statistics
of input domains may be crucial to the computations realized by
the dynamics7. Finally, certain required environmental variables
are often considered to be merely enabling and theoretically
uninteresting, and are hence not modeled explicitly.
Any theoretical account of implementation that overlooks
the above factors is partial at best and quite possibly severely
flawed8. It is especially important to enforce such constraints
when evaluating an MoC defined on trajectory spaces. If leaving
them out leads to a space that substantially differs in its structure,
applying the MoC to it would still yield data, but those data
would be meaningless or at least misleading. We will therefore
refer to the overall set of constraints on initial conditions and
on the implementation environment as the normal conditions for
implementing a computational structure.
Brains, Vats, and Normal Conditions
To illustrate the notion of normal conditions, let us consider
a (somewhat) concrete example: the embodiment problem
as exemplified in brain in a vat (BiV) scenarios. BiV
thought experiments typically involve providing the brain
with a simulated sensorimotor environment that is seamlessly
interpreted by it as being immersed in the real world. However,
6Of course, the question of how different is different enough is nontrivial. Below
we suggest that a critical determinant in establishing “sameness” in modeling
experience is the realization of an intrinsic structure of clusters, something that
is a multi-scale invariant of trajectory spaces.
7This is crucial not only for effective learning strategies; as vision, for instance,
teaches us, brains can only manage to generate meaningful virtual realities and
affordances on the fly via bridging assumptions about the statistical nature of the
world. Note that this is a computational necessity and not simply a result of the
“messy” or limited nature of brains (Wolpert and Macready, 1997).
8In the presence of inadmissible inputs or parameter values, a given set of
equations may no longer apply to a given physical substrate. Examples include
extremely loud sounds that destroy the ear, abnormal concentrations of essential
substances like nutrients that can abolish function or even kill biological tissue (and
hence systems), high temperature that reduces matter to a plasma, and high mass
concentration that results in a singularity.
whether or not achieving sufficient verisimilitude in simulating
the environment is feasible, to examine whether the embodiment
thesis is true, it is necessary to focus on the precise ways in which
the body affects what brains do, that is their dynamics. To that
end let us consider the normal conditions that apply.
An embodied brain can operate in many dynamical regimes
(and thus states of consciousness), some of which are maintained
in near absence of external stimulation such as in certain
sleep stages. If it proves possible to induce similar ongoing
(spontaneous) dynamics in the absence of stimulation within an
artificial setting, there would be a reason to believe that the BiV
scenario is plausible. Ipso facto, this would establish that the body
simply provides the brain with (part of the) normal conditions for
implementing its dynamics. However, the fact that brain tissue
in a vat exhibits very impoverished ongoing dynamics suggests
that providing normal conditions goes beyond controlling the
concentration of a few important types of molecules in the vat.
Indeed, if it turns out that to uphold the dynamics it is necessary
to maintain a dynamic biochemical environment that is coupled
to the dynamics of the brain tissue, this would amount to putting
in place an artificial construct mimicking a body. If this is the
case, the embodiment thesis would be vindicated, demonstrating
that bodily states do more than provide normal conditions for
the dynamics of the brain. Rather this would indicate, that bodily
processes must be encoded in the equations of any sufficiently
elaborate model of the dynamics giving rise to consciousness.
Normal Conditions and Hive Minds
Our next example focuses on the constraints associated with
admissible inputs under normal conditions, as they apply to
the problem of hive minds. Approaching the problem from
this vantage enables us to tease apart the circumstantial—as
indicated by behavior, or other external, and therefore extrinsic
factors—from intrinsic determinates. Let us consider a collection
of bees and assume that under normal conditions the pertinent
dynamical system modeling bee consciousness (such as it is) is
some “neural network” model of the bee’s brain. The question
is then, what would be the mark of an emergent brain or lack
thereof as determined exclusively by what the respective brains
actually do—that is intrinsically.
One possibility is that, whether or not other bees are present,
the bee’s brain undergoes the same dynamics. To specify which
computational structure it implements, we must consider all
possible input sequences (streams) paired with the resulting
(coincident) trajectories. Because the possibility of interacting
with the rest of the swarm is thereby tacitly implied, the putative
hive mind is, from an explanatory standpoint, superfluous,
regardless of the swarm’s actual presence.
Prima facie support for this scenario is found through
invoking the possibility of dreaming or hallucination. In humans,
any experience that is felt to be due to an external stimulus could
in principle be due to a dream or a hallucination. This suggests
that similar trajectories in our brain dynamics could be brought
about by quite different factors: the “real thing” (an actual input)
or a hallucination. This point applies, mutatis mutandis, to the
case of a putative hive mind in a bee swarm.
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Alternatively, if it is shown that the presence of other bees
leads to an implementation of a different dynamics—i.e., that
their presence is encoded in the equations governing each and
every bee’s dynamics, or, alternatively, that it leads to a phase
transition in the dynamics—it would be another matter. An
immediate implication would be that the associated trajectory
spaces would differ in their structure, suggesting that this is a
necessary condition for the emergence of a hive mind.
Similar considerations may point toward a way of
resolving boundary problems in general. For example, a
close consideration of the properties of trajectory spaces that are
associated with consciousness could make it apparent what a
litmus test should be for settling the question of the number or
unity of phenomenal minds realized by a physical substrate. In
the next section, we formalize this line of thinking by introducing
the notion of systemic properties, which will enable us to revisit
questions such as the emergence of hive minds.
THE BOUNDARY PROBLEM AND
SYSTEMIC PROPERTIES
When are parts and wholes (systems) not simply arbitrary
categories imposed by an external observer, but rather intrinsic
attributes of their own dynamics?9 A system (whole) should be
qualitatively different from the parts it comprises. These parts,
in turn, should be both distinct and in some sense independent
from the whole (to be considered as parts) and at the same
time should ineluctably “belong” to the whole. Accordingly, we
propose to analyze wholeness, in the context of the present
discussion, relative to a formal property, to be defined below,
which (i) would make the unity of the whole explicit and (ii)
would render it impossible for a part to pose as a whole.
To make this approach work in the framework of dynamical
system analysis, we must first acknowledge what is tacitly
implied: that it should be possible to identify, at each moment
in time, a set of distinct units (elements). In this sense, we begin
with a (putative) whole (system) and its parts (the elements that
are the building blocks of the model). In this setting, and under
some dynamics (paradigmatically, a set of equations), what would
it mean for the putative whole (system) to be one? Ex hypothesi,
it would mean that, with respect to the relevant property, a
collection of elements that forms a whole (system) admits no
parts (this of course does not necessarily carry over to other
functional properties of the elements in question). Similarly,
under this property a whole cannot be a part of some greater
whole: if it were, the latter would admit a part, contradicting the
initial assumption.
We require that the dynamical property used to distinguish
parts from wholes mesh naturally with the machinery of anMoC.
We proceed by initially focusing on formal properties of models,
then moving on to discuss the implications of the notion of
implementation under normal conditions.
9Whole-part relationships are normally the subject matter of mereology. However,
the notion of part that we are developing here places the present discussion largely
outside the scope of that discipline.
In what follows, dynamics is represented by vectors holding
the instantaneous states of a collection of elements and by rules
(equations), parameterized by a set of parameters 210, that
dictate how instantaneous states change over time11. We explore
scenarios in which dynamics are either expanded or contracted,
through addition or subtraction of elements to the model. The
most straightforward first step is to start with a complete model
encompassing all the elements under consideration, and work
our way down from it, to contracted models (and dynamics)
resulting from simply leaving out subsets of the elements, as well
as the terms pertaining to these elements in the equations.
Systemic Properties
Let Sˆ denote the complete system specifying a dynamics: the
elements, parameters, and equations. A system S would simply
be the model specified by choosing a subset of elements S ⊆ Sˆ. By
subsystem we will refer to any collection of elements s that is not
S itself, i.e., s ⊂ S. We refer to a choice (S, θ), as a realization
of the dynamics. A realization is a complete specification of a
model—typically a set of equations, one for each element in S—
down to the numeric values of the parameters, denoted by θ ,
and just as importantly the normal conditions associated with its
implementation. We refer to the process of reducing the scope of
a realization to that of a subsystem, by removing from the model
subsets of elements as well as any terms in the equations of the
full dynamics in which they appear, asmodel contraction.
By dynamic property ϕ(S, θ) we mean a (theoretically
motivated) property of the dynamics, formally stated. This can be
simply a computable real-valued (or real vector-valued) function
that should be sensitive to the choice of S (as it can lead to
differing dynamics) as well as to the parameters of the model
(as different parameters can also lead to qualitatively differing
dynamics).
Note that at times it might be desirable to express a
dynamics in terms of trajectory spaces. As this is an equivalent
representation12, there is nothing lost by it, and it seems that
it is much more natural to express some of our intuitions
regarding the nature and structure of experience in terms of
the structure of trajectory spaces (representational spaces). For
example a dynamics could be characterized through utilizing
functions defined on vector spaces, that is, functions that match
a given space (in its entirety) with a scalar (or vector)—such as
its dimensionality and degree of intrinsic clustering, which are
thought to be crucial for establishing representational capacity.
It is this sense of dynamical property that we will explore when
discussing the Geometric Theory of consciousness.
10It is possible that in doing this we gloss over a fundamental feature of brain
dynamics, namely, that parameters themselves change, albeit over longer time
scales.
112 denotes the set of all possible parameter values specified by the normal
conditions, whereas θ ∈ 2 denotes a specific choice of parameters.
12A dynamics uniquely determines a trajectory space. The converse is not
true strictly speaking; however, up to a relevant notion of equivalence (e.g.,
diffeomorphism) it is, and moreover, it is hard to see why one would be
interested in properties of the model that are not invariant with respect to
mere representation. Accordingly, assuming complete congruence seems perfectly
sensible.
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Alternatively in other cases it might be desirable to
characterize a dynamics through the structure of trajectories
themselves. For example consider a function f defined on
trajectories (e.g., sequences of instantaneous states of length M;
say an MoC), matching each with a real number: f :RN×M → R,
where N is the number of elements a system comprises. If for
every trajectory χ under a realization (S, θ), f (χ)> 0 this suffices
for establishing the dynamic property “positive under f .” It is this
notion of dynamic property that we will explore in the section on
Integrated Information Theory.
A proper part of a system under the property ϕ is a subsystem
s of S such that s +ϕ s 6=ϕS, where+ϕ and=ϕ denote the notions
of addition and equivalence as they pertain to ϕ. In the simplest
scenario, if ϕ matches a realization with a scalar, this could stand
for ϕ (s, θ) + ϕ (s, θ) 6= ϕ (S, θ). Another alternative, suitable
if ϕ is defined on trajectory spaces, is ϕ (s+i s, θ) 6= ϕ (S, θ)
where i is the inclusion map13. In this scenario ϕ is evaluated on
full trajectories produced by the two reduced dynamics running
simultaneously. Roughly speaking, the above inequality implies
that s exhibits different dynamics when operating “on its own”
as compared to operating within the putative system, and ϕ, at
least at this instant, is not indifferent to the greater context of the
building blocks of the given dynamics.
A normal cut of a system S is a bipartition of the elements in
S, that is any set {s, s} such that s, s 6= ∅.
A property ϕ is conjoint if every part of S is a proper part.
Conjoint properties are further classified as:
i Subadditive: if for every normal cut s+ϕ s >ϕ S
ii Superadditive: if for every normal cut s+ϕ s <ϕ S
iii Alloaditive: a conjoint property that is neither subadditive,
nor superadditive is alloadditive.
A conjoint property is systemic for S if S is not a proper part of
some greater system under this property. With this definition in
mind, we can say that the member of any subset of units that
contribute to realizing a systemic property “cares” about each
and every other unit or collection of units within the system.
For an example illustrating this definition see Appendix 2 in
Supplementary Material.
Let us see how a theory of consciousness could be free of
boundary problems in light of the above definitions. Consider
first the system/subsystem problem. If the property by virtue
of which a system in question is conscious is conjoint in the
above sense, under this property all its conceivable subsystems
or parts—e.g., where brains are concerned, all its significantly
smaller anatomical subdivisions, from lobes and areas down to
the sub-cellular machinery comprising brain cells—are proper
13If V is a subset of U, the inclusion map is a function i: U → V that sends every
x ∈ V to x ∈ U such that i (x) = x. In our case if we consider trajectories of length
M, and if (S, θ) allows for instantaneous states inRN (s, θ) inRk and (s, θ) inRN−k
we define: s+is ≡ i((s, θ) × (s, θ)) where, (s, θ) ⊆ R
M×K , (s, θ) ⊆ RM×(N−K), ×
is the Cartesian product, and i is the inclusion map. Practically speaking, when
comparing simulations of a complete system, and those of a normal cut, this
corresponds to attaching to each trajectory in s one in s when the contracted
dynamics are run in parallel (i.e., running the simulation with the pertinent
interaction terms set to 0 and evaluating the resulting trajectories as before).
parts14. This means that while each and every subsystem (subset
of units) actually affects the property as realized by the whole, the
subsystems cannot be said to do so independently: if they did,
the exact same value of ϕ would obtain, regardless of whether the
parts are “coupled” to the rest of the system. Conversely, in the
exact sense defined by ϕ, a subsystem that is not a proper part
is effectively decoupled from the rest of the elements at hand.
Of course, the exact notion of coupling depends on the model
in question.
Consider now the embodiment problem. If ϕ is systemic, at
some point along the process of expanding the dynamics, the
elements we are modeling become maximally interdependent. At
that point, adding more elements to the system singled out by ϕ
will not alter its value. This can happen if elements of a different
kind are added, or if similar elements are added such that they
interact with the rest of the elements in a different manner (e.g.,
though a different connectivity pattern). For example, if brains do
not critically depend on the body for giving rise to consciousness,
and ϕ were a straightforward MoC, then adding the body (or any
part of it) to themodel would leave ϕ within the brain unchanged.
Finally, with regard to hive minds, we note that if (embodied)
brains give rise to consciousness through a systemic property ϕ,
then they cannot be realizing a larger collective mind, because
to do so they would have to be proper parts of that collective, in
which case the unity achieved by their dynamics would be virtual
and hence ipso facto could not be the realizer of each and every
constituent mind.
If indeed systemic properties are an essential part of
the explanatory machinery in computational theories of
consciousness, can they be said to be intrinsic, as any viable
CTC must be? Let us rehearse what it means for a systemic
property to be intrinsic. First, it must be observer-independent,
as consciousness is. However, as a systemic property is a
dynamical property, defined with respect to a specific dynamics,
it simply inherits whatever intrinsic credentials the dynamics
possesses. Second, the property in question should a fortiori
meet any requirements imposed on extrinsic (observational or
attributional) properties. In this regard, systemic properties fare
particularly well, in that they suggest how (at least some aspects)
of a model can be established as being a “matter of fact.”
If we consider this last point in the context of experience,
an intriguing possibility presents itself. The premise behind all
computational approaches to modeling consciousness is that the
formal structure of dynamics not only determines whether or
not experience is realized, but is in fact (formally) equivalent to
the formal properties of any resulting phenomenal experience.
Given that systemic properties establish the fact of the matter in
terms of the unity (or the lack thereof) achieved though dynamic
properties, and given that these can be naturally expressed in
terms of the associated trajectory spaces, we can tentatively offer
14It is unclear at this point—and this may even be a metaphysical question—
whether there exists a sufficient level of detail for brain modeling. In practice, there
is the constraint of information saturation: once a certain level is reached, limited
sensitivity of measurement or computational limitations may preclude further
meaningful articulation of the model. This would signify that a “sufficient level
of detail” has been attained.
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them as (perhaps part of) the formal correspondence that makes
for the unity of experience.
Inputs and Normal Conditions in Model
Contraction
Recall that according to our definition, systemic properties are
contingent on the notion of model contraction. While our
notion of model contraction is formally sound, its applicability
to real life scenarios is not without difficulties. First, explicit
care is necessary in demarcating what are to be considered
inputs, elements, and normal conditions, as will be seen in
the first example below. Second, just as importantly, assessing
whether a dynamic property is systemic requires partitioning the
putative system into normal cuts. However, when contracting
the dynamics onto each side of the partition, it is crucial to
maintain normal conditions: by definition, a violation of normal
conditions leads to the implementation of a different dynamics.
Depending on the MoC, this could give rise to different MoC
values on each side of the partition, as compared to the intact
system, leading to the erroneous conclusion that they are proper
parts of the system. This point will be stressed in the second
example below.
Our first example here revisits the question of hive minds.
Given a putative MoC, to determine whether or not a collective
mind can emerge when bees swarm—that is, to establish whether
or not its relevant properties are systemic at the swarm level—
it is necessary to establish whether or not MoC values taken for
an entire swarm are invariant under normal cuts. To do so, the
dynamics needs to be evaluated while interactions between the
two parts of a cut are suppressed. However, as noted above, the
notion of interaction is theory/model-dependent, which suggests
that some very different approaches to this question may have to
be explored. To illustrate this point, let us consider two of the
possible theoretical approaches under which interactions among
bees can be formulated: 1) The interactions are explicitly encoded
in the equations governing each and every (embodied) bee brain;
2) The presence of other bees, as signaled by sound, sight, smell,
and so forth, are treated as inputs.
Of course, these approaches are not mutually exclusive. For
example, imagine that the “hive mode” could be dynamically
gated via specific signals such as pheromones, a process that
would be represented in explicit (interaction) terms in each and
every set of equations describing the dynamics of a single bee
brain, whereas other aspects of the swarm’s presence would be
treated as inputs. The crucial question is whether or not the
model includes explicit interaction terms. If it does, normal cuts
imply comparing the dynamics of (say) a single bee brain, with
and without deactivating the mechanisms encoded as interaction
terms in the model. In the present example, this would mean
deactivating the pheromone receptors and glands of the single
bee, then letting it loose in the hive with the swarm and the queen
present15. Alternatively (with no explicit interaction terms), in
the “bee as input” scenario, a normal cut could be obtained
15Normal cuts that do not involve single bees would be more difficult to realize,
requiring something along the lines of genetic manipulation to create a population
of bees with an alternative system of pheromones in our example.
by removing the other bees. To keep the comparison of the
dynamics before and after taking the cut fair, the removed bees
should be replaced with holograms of recorded dances on the
removed side of the partition in the same conditions. If that
were technically possible, it would make it possible to assess the
dynamics while keeping its interactive (reactive/dynamic) aspect
suppressed (this aspect is presumably what underlies the swarm’s
hive mind, by instantiating a communal computation). We will
revisit the question of the (im)possibility of hive minds in light of
two suggested frameworks for measuring consciousness that we
shall discuss in the following sections.
In our second example, we focus on the difficulties with
model contraction that stem from the normal conditions for
implementation. Let us return for a moment to the question of
whether or not the cerebellum (say) contributes to the experience
that a brain helps to realize. To address this question, we must
be able to specify what it means to implement the contracted
brain dynamics that exclude the cerebellum. It may be possible
to assess the dynamics of a brain with the cerebellum (or some
other part) temporarily and reversibly deactivated; if this proves
to have no impact on the pertinent dynamical property, it would
settle the above question. However, for other parts of the brain,
such as the hypothalamus, the brain stem, or the basal forebrain,
deactivation would lead to a catastrophe. Does this indicate that
the brain stem (say) takes part in realizing experience, or simply
that deactivation is not an appropriate means for implementing
contraction?
To complicate things further, it is conceivable that
deactivating a brain structure would lead to noticeable effects
simply by effectively changing the normal conditions for
networks in its vicinity, e.g., by changing the electrochemical
environment of these structures, leading to altered intrinsic
function of neuronal networks. In the same vein, we have shown
elsewhere (Fekete and Edelman, 2012) that relegating salient
aspects of brain physiology to the background role of normal
conditions by considering them as housekeeping can lead to a
radically different perspective on neural replacement scenarios.
The upshot of these considerations is that special care is needed
with regard to the assumptions associated with establishing
normal conditions. We will revisit this issue in the next section,
where we discuss Tononi’s Integrated Information Theory (IIT)
while considering its take on contracted dynamics.
TONONI’S IIT: IS INTEGRATED
CONCEPTUAL INFORMATION A
SYSTEMIC PROPERTY?
Tononi’s Integrated Information Theory (Tononi, 2004, 2011;
Balduzzi and Tononi, 2008; Oizumi et al., 2014) is the only theory
of consciousness that we are aware of that offers an explicit
measure of level of consciousness, expressed in absolute units
that apply to all possible discrete element information network
architectures. In the following discussion of IIT, we will focus
more on the conceptual framework afforded by IIT, and less
on the technical details involved in estimating the amount of
integrated conceptual information that a system gives rise to
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at a given point in time. According to IIT, a (putative) system
comprises a set of elements that can assume discrete states, as
well as a specification of the transition rules among such states
(as determined by interaction among elements). While IIT aims
to describe sets of elements that influence each other’s states by
direct physical causal interactions (modeled after synapses or
nerve tracts), it can be applied to any set of elements taking
discrete states. The goal of IIT is to distinguish between intrinsic
systemhood and systems that are merely a matter of attribution.
The IIT is based on the notion of integrated information (II).
For any (sub)set of elements in a given state (of activation),
referred to as a mechanism, the amount of II it gives rise to is
evaluated relative to the possible past and future states that could
have caused/would likely have resulted from the current state. II
relative to possible past (future) states is defined as the distance
between (a) the probability distribution of previous (next) states
that could have caused (resulted from) the current state and (b)
the probability distribution derived from partitioning the system
into parts such that the difference between the distributions is
minimized (referred to as theminimum information partition)16.
Finally II is defined to be the minimum of the past and future
II. Thus, II measures the extent to which a current state is
informative relative to its causes and effects, when the entire
mechanism (set of causal interactions and an activation state)
is considered, over and above that afforded by its parts (sub-
mechanisms).
IIT recognizes the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic
perspectives: the amount of II will differ if the mechanism is
considered as part of different subsets of elements. IIT postulates
that only the maximal II exists, that is, is intrinsic, and suggests
that to find it II should be evaluated relative to all possible partial
inputs and outputs (past and future states). Any mechanism that
gives rise to nonzero maximal II is then referred to as a concept,
as it singles out a partial set of input and output units (partial
states) that have the most informative (i.e., strongly causal) ties
to the mechanism. This relation captures some of the intuitions
we associate with concepts, namely, that certain definite features
of recent/momentary experience imply a conceptual distinction,
and a concept in turn implies certain likely aspects of the
subsequent experience. The reduced set of partial input and
output states identified in the process is referred to as core cause
and core effect repertoires, respectively.
We can see that within a collection of units in a given state,
several such concepts can be realized at the same time and
form complicated (e.g., compositional and nested) structures.
A constellation of concepts, and through that the current state
of a (putative) system, can be evaluated for their integrated
conceptual information (ICI), which generalizes the notion of
II to the system level. ICI is computed by taking the weighted
sum of the difference between the II of the constituents of the
constellation of concepts contained within a set of units and
the maximal II given across all unidirectional bi-partitions of
16In earlier versions of IIT, the distance was defined as the Kullback–Leibler (KL)
divergence, leading to the mutual information as defined in Shannon’s information
theory. At present, however, IIT is formulated using an actual metric (the KL
divergence in not symmetrical) which makes the second I in IIT somewhat
metaphorical.
the collection of units17, quantifying the conceptual information
that emerges from the whole over and above the conceptual
information that inheres in the parts of the system. The II of each
concept is weighted by the distance between the core cause and
effect repertoires before and after the partitions. The ICI for any
given subset of elements is denoted by8.
IIT holds that 8 directly measures, and is in fact identical
to, the amount of realized experience by a putative system
(if any) in a given activation state, with one fundamental
qualification. While 8 can be applied in many ways that are
observer-dependent (extrinsic), only those realizations of8 exist
(that is, are intrinsic) that are maximal in the sense (i) that a
different system would result if one varies the spatial grain of the
description (e.g., neurons vs. cortical columns) or its temporal
grain (e.g., ms vs. s) and (ii) that 8 can be applied to any
collection of objects. Therefore, consciousness in a collection of
elements S in an activation state exists if and only if (1) 8 > 0
for S; (2) for every subsystem of S (s⊂S), 8 is smaller; (3) S is
not contained in any larger system S’ for which 8 is greater. A
system S satisfying these conditions is referred to as a complex
and the constellation of concepts it forms is referred to as a quale.
This is the exclusion principle: a complex is said to exclude any
other systems giving rise to nonzero ICI that it includes or is
included in.
Seeing that 8 is a (theoretically) computable real function,
it would seem to fall under our definition of a superadditive
systemic property: 8 is established relative to normal cuts,
therefore by construction it is greater than the ICI of produced
by its subsystems on their own, and if it is not contained by any
systemwith larger8, it is not a proper part of any larger system18.
Accordingly, IIT purports to solve both the system/subsystem
and hive mind problems (Tononi and Koch, 2015): Aggregates
of minds cannot fuse—while they do give rise to an irreducible
causal structure, and hence to nonzero (and non-trivial) ICI, it is
nevertheless smaller than the ICI produced by each brain on its
own and therefore is excluded by them. Similarly, by definition a
brain giving rise to a complex excludes its sub-mechanisms from
being conscious.
However, until proven otherwise, ICI cannot be regarded as a
systemic property, because, on the face of it, it does not satisfy our
definition of a dynamic property: it is a property of a system in an
activation state (a complex of mechanisms in a state), and not of
a system under a realization of a dynamics. This of course raises
the question why impose this requirement in the first place, and
therefore whether it makes sense to relax this constraint. First,
we note that it would be strange indeed if a systemic property
were not always true of a(n intact) system. That said, we would
like to carefully examine the ramifications of having an activation
state dependent definition for ICI. We will argue that in order
17That is, dividing the units into two non-overlapping sets (a normal cut) A and B
and computing the II for each of the concepts first with the connections between
A and B severed, and then the other way around.
18In fact IIT makes a stronger claim: that no overlapping complexes can exist.
This is consistent with Tononi’s view that only the thalamo-cortical system is
responsible for experience. In that case two minds could exist in the split brain
syndrome, as the overlap in the systems is outside the “dynamic core” that gives
rise to ICI.
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to capture some of the most basic properties of consciousness
as found in humans, a future fully developed IIT will have to
all but prove that exclusion is dynamic (and hence systemic—in
the sense specified in the example “positive under f ” in Section
Systemic Properties) in the sense we introduced. The logic behind
our arguments applies to any activity state-based definition of
systemic properties.
The Spatiotemporal Grain of Experience
As noted by IIT, our experience indeed has typical spatiotemporal
grain (at least for a given state of consciousness). This is part
of IIT’s explanatory appeal: ICI computation can single out the
pertinent grain while seeking maximal ICI across spatial and
temporal scales, as well as collections of elements. However,
for these claims to be effective, the maxima of ICI should be
unique: that is, the same maximal value of ICI cannot result from
considering a system at highly disparate grain levels. Similarly,
it needs to be shown, at least for systems like the mammalian
brain, that typical grain is invariant. Perhaps, it is sufficient to
show that this is the case within a given state of consciousness,
assuming that these can be naturally parameterized for the model
in question. But plausibly, given that states of consciousness seem
to form a low dimensional manifold (Hobson et al., 2000), with
regions which at the least seem to be graded in their properties
(wakefulness would be a region which would vary in terms of
properties such as the richness of experience and other qualitative
differences—e.g., alertness and drowsiness), we would require
that such gradients be shown to result naturally through ICI
computations for a given architecture.
The Number of Minds Realized by a System
There is overwhelming evidence to the effect that intact (normal)
brains give rise to a single mind during conscious states.
Therefore, it needs to be shown that an architecture like the
mammalian brain gives rise to a single maximal complex that
is substantially larger than any other ICI bubbles (that IIT is
willing to accept as) existing alongside it, not per activity state,
but across the board. Alternatively, if it were shown that under
certain circumstances this is not the case, this would amount to a
critical testable prediction.
Conceptual Coherence
Under IIT a complex in a state of activation gives rise to a
conceptual structure. However, IIT does not provide us with
tools or even an intuition as to the structural properties of such
concepts given a particular system. For example, we would expect
that at least within a given state of consciousness it could be
shown that the resulting conceptual structures are of similar
complexity (or have some typical structure), and moreover we
would want to see that for possible successive states of activation
such structures are, if not identical, at least highly similar in
the overwhelming majority of cases. Otherwise it is hard to see
how consistent behavior could be explained, especially behavior
that can only be performed consciously. In fact, it is plausible
that more stringent constraints are called for, given that thought
and behavior seem consistent over longer time scales, and that
conscious and unconscious mental processing typically mesh
together seamlessly.
The Locus of a Complex within a Brain
At its present state of development, IIT cannot point to where
one could expect to find the concurrent complex, say in a human
brain-like model in a “conscious” regime. Thus, for all that
we know, such a complex at two points in time might span
non-overlapping parts of the thalamo-cortical system (according
to IIT). Imagine that this is true when switching between
tasks—say, between watching a movie, which is thought to
activate mainly occipital regions if one is immersed in viewing
(Aalto et al., 2002; Goldberg et al., 2006), and discussing it, which
presumably activates frontal and temporal regions. This would
render personal identity virtual even for the shortest of spans;
it would also be incompatible with our experience of carrying
out prolonged mental operations consciously. Moreover, if my
brain at time t and time t + 1 gives rise to non-overlapping
complexes, and so does yours, are those four distinct bursts of
experience, or perhaps could one’s mind (whatever that means
here) transmigrate, given that, as we just noted, IIT cannot tell us
anything about conceptual coherence of complexes? Presumably
one could argue that the excluded bits of body and brain
operating in zombie mode somehow provide this consistency,
and anchor such snippets of experience to support the illusion
of phenomenal identity and of consistent information processing
across time. But given that IIT argues that the only thing that
makes a system one is being in an activation state that supports
a complex that is completely encapsulated, this account seems
problematic19.
Consistency across Realizations
ICI computation presupposes that physical states can be parsed
into discrete quantities. However, we have no understanding or
intuition as to how this choice affects the nature of the resulting
complexes, if any, for a given system (a set of transition rules).
For all we know, two different choices of number of possible
states for each element, together with the selection of the required
threshold(s) leads to the emergence of a radically different state
of affairs: say, the realization of four equal complexes in one
scenario at one spatio-temporal grain, as compared to a single
complex at a different grain of the same ICI level. The plausible
way out, it seems to us, would be to show that a given architecture
gives rise to maximal ICI across all states of activation when
described in a particular way in terms of number of states and
thresholds. Anything less would render IIT’s claims for intrinsic
existence unconvincing.
Furthermore, IIT’s stipulation that only themaximal ICI exists
is potentially problematic in a related sense, given its disregard of
inherent constraints on inputs and initial conditions. To compute
ICI, one has to explore all logically possible states to determine
which states can lead to (from) the current state. However,
without ruling out inadmissible inputs and internal states, and
without weighting states properly according to the pertinent
statistics (say, of possible inputs), the resulting information score
19In contrast, and account assuming that an embodied brain is necessary for
experience would avoid such pitfalls.
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could change noticeably. IIT claims that this uniform prior (in
Bayesian terms) is intrinsic; however, given that neural networks
arguably implement Bayesian computations universally (Knill
and Pouget, 2004) and that inadmissible states are ruled out by
the laws of physics along with the structure of the mechanisms
at work, this reasoning seem less than conclusive. Furthermore,
the bipartitions in computing ICI are created by retaining
unidirectional connections, rather than by severing connections
entirely—a move that could change the ICI values. This design
choice is far from obvious; taken together with the two earlier
observations, it suggests that IIT needs to naturalize its treatment
of normal conditions for it to make a stronger case for indeed
being intrinsic.
These question marks have to do to a large extent with
computational tractability problem that ICI faces: it can at
present be numerically estimated for systems of no more than
about 12 binary elements (and the larger the number of supposed
states the bigger the problem). Hence, given the extreme
computational complexity in estimating 8, the fundamental
properties of this measure remain unclear. Accordingly, the way
forward may be for the definitions of the various information
measures incorporated into IIT to be extended to continuous
measures (Barrett and Seth, 2011), which would allow applying
analysis methods to try and systematically (no pun intended)
answer such questions. And to reiterate, as to address the
issues at hand—demonstrating consistency under exclusion for
a given architecture, pinning down the number of emergent
minds, determining their “grain” in space and time, ensuring
their continuity in space and time, as well as guaranteeing the
congruence of the conceptual/perceptual domains in which the
realized experiences live—necessitates sweeping across activity
states—our notion of dynamic properties appears unavoidable20.
To summarize, in its current state of development, IIT’s
notion of a systemic property leans too heavily toward
transient states of activation. Thus, in the terminology of
Sections Model Selection, The Boundary Problem, and Inter-
Theory Convergence and The Boundary Problem and Systemic
Properties, 8 seems to fall somewhere between a systemic
property and hot spot analysis.
THE GEOMETRIC THEORY REVISITED
The Geometric Theory of consciousness (GT; Shepard, 1987;
Edelman, 1998, 1999; Gärdenfors, 2004; Fekete et al., 2009;
Fekete, 2010; Fekete and Edelman, 2011, 2012), like any other
computational approach, seeks to understand the formal and
structural properties realized by the physical activity of systems
that cause consciousness to emerge. Because experience unfolds
in time, the basic unit of analysis is taken to be trajectories of
(open) dynamical systems. The question thus becomes: what in
the composition of such a trajectory makes it more or less fit for
realizing phenomenal content?
20In fact the requirements for consistency are more stringent, as we would seek it
not only within systems, but across systems: learning, development, and evolution
can be viewed as following paths in system space (Yoshimi, 2010). And as the
changes along these paths seem for the most part graded and systematic, we would
want to know that this is the case for a purported systemic property.
According to one intuition, it is something about the structure
of this instance of activity—a given trajectory—that makes it
suitable to give rise to this bit of phenomenal experience. The
GT, however, is founded on the realization that even the simplest
phenomenal content (a quale) has relational aspects to it, which
implies that it can only exist as a particular manifestation of
an entire perceptual/conceptual domain. Thus, this activity that
gives rise to this red is also an example of a category—a region in
the space of all hues implemented by the mind in question, which
is in turn linked to a multitude of other categories, ultimately
making up the phenomenal world, or “reality” as it presents itself
to the mind.
This activity is a particular example of another category as
well: the category of experiences belonging to a state (mode)
of consciousness. One attribute that differentiates among states
of consciousness is the richness of the experienced phenomenal
content, which differs across states. Conversely, within a given
state of consciousness, the richness (“amount”) of phenomenal
content is constant. Because it is the structure of activity
trajectories that realizes phenomenal content, it follows that all
the trajectories in given a state of consciousness are in some sense
structurally equivalent.
Now, as some trajectories do not give rise to phenomenal
content at all, by the same logic they must be devoid
of such structural features, and complementarily, trajectories
associated with increasingly rich experience should exhibit
increasingly “rich” structure. Accordingly, the GT posits a
notion of complexity that captures the exact structural features
corresponding to varying phenomenal richness, that is, to
different states of consciousness21. By the same token, each state
of consciousness—that is, level of complexity of activity—would
be associated with a set of all possible activity trajectories that the
system could generate when in this state.
The GT is concerned first and foremost with understanding
the structure of such trajectory spaces, that is, their geometry.
It assumes that trajectory spaces are isomorphic to the
perceptual/conceptual domains they realize, which is to say
that the formal structure of the physical activity giving rise
to consciousness is equivalent to the formal structure of
experience22 (Shepard, 1987; Edelman, 1998, 1999; Gärdenfors,
2004; Fekete et al., 2009; Fekete, 2010; Fekete and Edelman,
2011, 2012). This implies that every salient feature of experience
is expressible in terms of some definite structural feature of a
pertinent trajectory space, and, conversely, that salient features of
activity trajectory spaces must manifest in experience (if not, why
21It stands to reason to first develop a measure of neural complexity as pertains
to changes in conscious state, mainly in the context of the mammalian brain,
as a first step in understanding complexity in brains in general, as well as in
aliens or artificial systems. For the purposes of the present discussion, we assume
that complexity is a scalar real-valued function. However, there are good reasons
to think that this measure should be at least two-dimensional (e.g., to encode
qualitative difference as well as “quantity” of richness or level of consciousness;
Hobson et al., 2000). This, however, has no direct bearing on the subject matter, as
long as such a measure enables readout of level of consciousness, possibly after an
additional transformation.
22And of course the goal of the GT is to identify such properties. GT argues that
this isomorphism should be at least an isometry.
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would some structural features of trajectory spaces be associated
with phenomenal character while others would not?).
The basic organizational principles of perceptual/conceptual
domains are local similarity and topological connectedness:
given a segment of experience, arguably there is another
possible segment that differs from the first one infinitesimally
along any of the dimensions or attributes it consists of,
and any such experience can be gradually altered until
ultimately a completely different experience emerges. More
broadly, the above properties imply that categories—regions
in perceptual/conceptual domains—are characterized by family
resemblance.
The structure of family resemblance is induced via a distance
measure: primal similarity in phenomenal content can be
expressed in terms of inverse distance between trajectories in
the trajectory space23. Just as the members of a category share a
family resemblance, the corresponding trajectories are clustered
together in the trajectory space. The distance relationships among
these clusters are such that they reflect the myriad of similarities
and differences between categories (as they are present in
experience, not reflected upon). Accordingly, if one were to
coarse-grain the space, categories would coalesce to form higher
order categories, and so on. In other words, the hierarchical
organization of categories expresses itself in amultiscale structure
of clusters.
How does the state of consciousness affect this structure?
In the absence of consciousness, there should be no such
structure; as phenomenality emerges and experience becomes
richer, increasingly finer distinctions inhering in the associated
phenomenal content become possible. According to the GT,
this is brought about by an increasingly elaborate structure of
categories reflecting these distinctions. To a first approximation,
the complexity of a cluster structure derives from the number
of clusters, or rather the number of configurations of clusters
(recall that categories themselves can vary continuously, and
each configuration can vary in its dimensionality, which loosely
corresponds to the number of attributes along which the
distinctions differentiating these categories present themselves).
The key constraint on the cluster structures is that they be
intrinsic. With this in mind, consider first the extreme case
of a geometric object that lacks such structure—for instance,
a homogeneous solid volume in space, such as the unit
(hyper)cube. Any distinction between regions internal to this
volume would necessarily be imposed from the outside and thus
not intrinsic. To possess intrinsic structure, the volume cannot
be uniformly solid: there must be some “holes” (just like the
necessary condition for drawing a shape using only one color is
not to cover the entire page uniformly with ink). Accordingly, to
detect inherent clustering, one must find such holes, count them,
and quantify their dimensionality (cf. a circle has one 1D hole in
it, a sphere has one 2D hole, and a torus two 1D holes and a 2D
hole; see Appendix 1 in Supplementary Material, Figure S1).
How can holes be detected? Intuitively, by slicing the space
in which the object resides into regular cross-sections (for more
23This distance derives naturally from the topological and geometrical attributes
of the trajectory space.
details see: Fekete et al., 2009; Fekete and Edelman, 2011). While
this is an extrinsicmeasure, which depends on the choice of grain,
if the cross-sectioning is carried out across all possible scales, the
result is invariant (up to reparametrization). An added benefit is
that the resulting descriptor is by definition a multiscale one and
thus is sensitive to higher order cluster structure (see Figure S2).
The resulting descriptors are called a multi-scale homology
(mSH): for each scale, the result is a vector, holding a hole count
for each dimension. For simplicity, let us set aside the scale
parameter24 and assume that each trajectory space results in a
vector that lists the cluster configurations in each dimension, thus
expressing the complexity of structure (or the lack thereof) of the
respective perceptual/conceptual domain.
Recalling the terminology introduced earlier in this paper, we
note that the GT postulates the existence of an MoC: changes
in the complexity of activity trajectories go hand in hand with
changes in the complexity of the structure of the resulting
trajectory space, and thus in the mSH of a (putative) system in
a given state of its dynamics (and, if appropriate structure is
in place, changes in the state of consciousness). The GT refers
to this dual aspect of complexity as representational capacity;
accordingly, trajectory spaces arising from complex dynamics
that exhibit rich intrinsic clustering may be referred to as
representational spaces.
We hypothesize that the complexity of trajectory spaces
associated with conscious systems is a systemic property,
expressed by the mSH associated with a measure of (neural)
complexity. That is, in true systems (under this property) the
parts interact collectively to produce a conceptual/perceptual
space that could not have resulted from the actions of the
constituent subsystems in isolation, leading to a richer overall
structure of the emergent trajectory space. However, with respect
to high dimensional geometry, complexity is not simply additive:
merging of low dimensional structure can result in higher level
structure, a scenario that would decrease the lower level hole
count while increasing the higher level count (see Appendix 2 in
Supplementary Material). In other words, according to the GT,
intrinsic systems such as (embodied) brains are expected to be
alloadditive.
What are the implications of this claim with regard to the
system/subsystem problem as it applies to the brain? The various
parts of the brain are expected by the GT to interact to produce
a trajectory space that is qualitatively different from the spaces
produced by any normal cut (and by extension by any subsystem)
in that its structure is of greater complexity. As noted, this is
likely to manifest as an elaborate higher order structure (that is,
an increase in the cluster configuration count in relatively high
dimensions), but perhaps this is accompanied by a suppression
of low dimensional structure. Perhaps it is best to think of
this as a gauge of causal density, as complexity can arise only
if there is a tension between local and global dynamics. If
the elements of a system are entirely independent, no novel
non-trivial global pattern can emerge, whereas if the elements
24The multiscale homology descriptors can be greatly simplified by resorting to
persistent homology, resulting in discrete descriptors called barcodes, over which
a metric can be defined (Carlsson et al., 2004).
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are too strongly coupled, uniform (or at least less structured)
dynamics emerges.
The GT thus explains why multi-scale complexity of
activity, which brings about non-trivial trajectory spaces and
hence nonzero representational capacity, can only arise if the
representational labor is divided between elements (units), such
that some specialize in (i.e., are more attuned to) lower order
features (in terms of geometry) of the representational space (and
hence the perceptual/conceptual domain thus realized), whereas
others are explicitly tuned to features of varying scope in the
categorical hierarchy (Fekete, 2010). This implies that if systems
are not coupled in the right manner, their interaction will not
promote the emergence of higher order structure, thus failing to
form the right kind of (computational) unity necessary to support
a systemic property.
Similar considerations apply to the embodiment problem.
While at this point the GT is very general and does not offer
specific details regarding the nature of the elements that can
make up a system that could establish the right kind of dynamics,
nevertheless it seems to be more naturally compatible with an
outlook in which the major representational heavy lifting carried
out by brains is in producing graded electrochemical activity that
shifts in time, and not spiking activity (Fekete and Edelman,
2012). If so, it could be argued that many signaling pathways
between the brain and the body are similar in kind to the activity
produced by the brain, albeit operating on slower time scales. We
may then hypothesize that while the body on its own produces
a trivial trajectory space, coupling it with a brain profoundly
alters the multiscale structure of the trajectory space generated
by the brain.
What about hive minds? According to the GT, for minds to
fuse and form a collective mind, the emergent joint trajectory
space has to be more complex compared to the aggregate of the
respective spaces. If we apply the causal density perspective to
this scenario, we see that this is an unlikely outcome. Consider
the “Chinese gym” scenario (Block, 1980; Searle, 1990). In this
scenario, a roomful of non-Chinese speaking men enact a neural
network model that converses in Chinese, by each taking the
role of a node or synapse. The question of interest is whether
understanding of Chinese can thus be achieved (as it clearly
cannot by the individuals on their own).
According to the notion of implementation articulated above,
the collective in this case seems to merit the “systems reply,”
namely, that understanding is to be found at the level of the
collective only (Chalmers, 2011). However, according to our
analysis (and Chalmers’ original one as well), the “gym” does not
in fact realize the (combinatorial state) machine (formal structure
or algorithm corresponding to the causal organization of the
collective) that supposedly understands Chinese as opposed to
being able merely to converse in Chinese. This is because in
fact each possible transition specified in terms of the single units
(the people in the gym) fails to implement the counterfactual
stipulations of the form Ii ⇒ Ok (representing an input-output
matching, or “strong conditionals” in the language of Chalmers,
1996).
The reason for this is simple: whether or not a person agrees
to participate, is paid, or is coerced to do so, the scenario would
be far from satisfying such a strong constraint; nothing in the
situation will force a person to invariably act stereotypically each
and every time across all normal scenarios. Accordingly, one
may conclude that the collective structures formed by groups or
societies are of a different kind compared to the computational
structures realized by brains—both in that they are observer-
dependent (and hence extrinsic) and in that they fail to introduce
the right kind of causal density necessary to give rise to the
requisite non-trivial complexity.
DISCUSSION
In this paper, we have outlined what we believe are some
necessary conditions that an open dynamical system must satisfy
if it is to realize phenomenal content. Specifically, properties that
we called systemic offer a principled mechanism for singling out
intrinsic systems, and thus for banishing the troubling notion
of countless redundant/virtual minds formed by subsystems
and aggregates of systems, whose existence would otherwise
be implied by consciousness being construed as a matter of
fact—that is, it being a measurable quantity.
The idea of systemic analysis clearly requires further work.
As yet, we cannot offer a concrete example of a system (e.g.,
a model) that provably possesses the requisite property. In
particular, given the lack of understanding of the particulars
implied by computational theories of consciousness, it is difficult
to establish reasonable normal conditions under which system
expansion and contraction can be studied without running the
risk of begging the question or missing the point through making
arbitrary decisions or letting pre-theoretical commitments creep
in unnoticed through this oft-neglected back door.
On a more positive note, the mechanism of system expansion
(contraction) constitutes a principled means for understanding
the systemic properties of models. For example, through
expanding a model to infinity (or contracting it to zero), one
can hope to understand if and how certain features of networks
(say, patterns of connectivity) systematically increase (decrease)
a dynamical property that is thought to promote experience (as
in, for instance, the effect of small-world network structure on
systemic integrated information).
Hive Minds Revisited: Is the US Conscious?
An interesting test case for the proposed theory is Schwitzgebel’s
(2015) recent treatment of the hive mind problem. If
consciousness is brought about by complex interactions
among a multitude of units, we may be nearing the point at
which the interactions among the people in the US would be
more complex than those realized by a single brain, from which
we may expect the USA to be conscious. According to the
analysis offered here, the US is simply an aggregate of systems,
such that the trajectory space they jointly realize is simply the
“sum” of the individual structures. This is due to the fact that
under normal conditions an embodied brain gives rise to the
exact same trajectory space if taken as an individual or as part
of a collective. We argue that this is because the causal density
of interpersonal interactions does not approach that of neurons
(and glia) in an embodied brain. However, this is not to deny
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altogether the possibility of “brain fusion,” which can perhaps be
achieved by actually “wiring” embodied brains together (in the
sense of setting in place the necessary dense causal structure).
A thought experiment adapted from Schwitzgebel (2015)
seems to challenge our notion of systemic properties: if such
causally dense connections are formed gradually, we would
appear to go from a state in which in an instant the collective
minds of the US are wiped out and superseded by a supermind25.
If we assume that a supermind comes into being, according to
our analysis this would mean that the collective gives rise to a
trajectory space—and hence a perceptual/conceptual space—that
is different from the aggregate of the those of the individuals, and
that the underlying dynamics in each and every individual would
be different, that is, could only be achieved in the presence of
the whole. Therefore, we think that in the process suggested by
Schwitzgebel, the individual constituent minds would gradually
lose their independence, and as a result the individual minds
would be transformed and “phased out,” to be superseded by the
supermind. As in any phase transition—that is, switching to a
qualitatively different dynamical regime as a result of change in
the parameters of themodel (in this case the connectivity between
units)—this change can bemore or less abrupt, and strange things
can happen at the transition.
Systemic Properties and the Unity of
Consciousness
Our notion of systemic properties ipso facto affords a naturalistic
definition of the unity of experience26. This is true both from
the perspective of the GT and of IIT, inasmuch as they can
be realized in full as research programs. This is because the
trajectories of an intrinsic system are by definition unified wholes,
that by virtue of the categorical role they play (in the pertinent
perceptual/conceptual space) nevertheless exhibit (realize) finer
detail. To reiterate, from this perspective unified experiences
are the fundamental entities: they can only come into existence
through unity (also with regard to the entire possible space of
experiences, as that is entailed by realizing a dynamical property).
It is important to note however, that while our framework
naturally accommodates the unity of experience, it is agnostic
as far as the experience of unity goes (Welshon, 2013; Bennett
and Hill, 2015; van Leeuwen, 2015): many facets of the content of
our experience are “unified” in one sense or another, whether in
objects, across different sensory modalities, or in seemingly more
fundamental ways such as perspectivalness and even selfhood.
However, as both brain-damaged patients and the effects of
psychoactive drugs demonstrate (Shanon, 2002; Welshon, 2013;
Bennett and Hill, 2015; van Leeuwen, 2015), such variants of
content unity likely arise from specific mechanisms and do not
constitute necessary aspects of experience, whereas unity in its
barest form is simply synonymous with there being something it
is like to undergo it.
25According to IIT one mind would exclude the other at any given point in time,
thus predicting a sharp transition from the aggregate to the uber-mind (if the
premise is accepted—as noted earlier IIT denies the possibility of this scenario).
26We take unity to be “phenomenal unity,” construed as there being something
it is like for a subject to undergo an experience that is multifaceted (Bayne and
Chalmers, 2003).
Systemic Properties and Panpsychism
While our analysis rules out naive panpsychist accounts (i.e.,
that every object has a mind), it does lead one to expect that the
prevalence of consciousness in various substrates depends on the
MoC that establishes systemic dynamic properties. At this point,
it is unclear what the “lower bounds” are in terms of systems
that can instantiate the right kind of dynamics. For example,
could consciousness arise in organisms without a nervous
system? In single cell organisms? In plants? In molecules?
This raises another related question: how to construe a null
outcome indicated by an MoC. At least in some cases—say,
at the limit of contraction of a systemic property, or where an
unconscious brain is concerned—one is tempted to invoke the
notion of “proto-consciousness,” that is, some minimal glimmer
of experience, so far removed from our own that very little
can be said of it. Therefore, it would seem that what Chalmers
refers to as constitutive panpsychism (or proto panpsychism;
Chalmers, 2016) is perhaps compatible with the framework of
systemic properties. Be that as it may, our approach implies
that such considerations are almost invariably premature before
the respective theory is articulated in enough detail, not only
formally, but practically (that is, through detailed considerations
of implementation).
Systemic Properties and the Dynamic
Nature of Consciousness
The GT and IIT differ in many regards, not the least of which is
their treatment of the temporal nature of experience. While IIT
treats “moments” of experience as discrete episodes, and hence
is concerned with mechanisms (systems of interacting elements)
in a state (of activation), GT recognizes that computation,
and therefore also experience, takes time to unfold. Using
considerations of representational capacity, GT shows that the
apparent continuity of unfolding experience necessitates time-
continuous dynamics, thus concluding that consciousness is in
fact dynamic (Fekete and Edelman, 2012).
Nevertheless, even though the dynamic nature of experience
remains a polarizing topic both in cognitive science (Herzog
et al., 2016) and philosophy (Dainton, 2014), our definition of
dynamical properties does not assume that the physical analogs
of experience are dynamic, that is, that they are necessarily
defined on trajectories and not instantaneous states. This point
of contention is therefore beyond the scope of the present
discussion.
Noise, Complex Dynamics, and
Implementation
The notion of implementation in our analysis, as mentioned
above, presupposes deterministic state transitions in the
following sense: that the total state of the system fully determines
the next step in a dynamics. Without this stipulation, alluding
to the possibility of an intrinsic description, even in an
idealized sense, may be seen as unconvincing. However, the
current understanding of brain dynamics, and of complex
systems in general, suggests that models that do not incorporate
stochastic factors cannot quite deal with real life situations
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satisfactorily—an observation that is seemingly at odds with
the stress we place on detail-oriented analysis. This is only
an apparent lacuna, as our analysis strictly concerns open
systems—systems that are subject at all times to external
perturbation. While we referred to the latter as input, a term
suggestive of transduction of highly specific environmental
events, the framework we describe admits a much wider scope
of external influence. Specifically, assuming that a dynamics is
fully specified by a system of equations, each equation naturally
accommodates both noise and input terms (e.g., as in stochastic
differential equations).
It could be argued, that a dynamics driven by noise could
hardly produce a stable enough trajectory space, let alone
the complex multiscale structure necessary to give rise to
phenomenal content. We wholeheartedly agree: this reinforces
the idea that for dynamics to support experience there are
many hurdles to be cleared. It is for this reason exactly
that our nervous system balances between being amenable
to external influence and maintaining rich spontaneous (i.e.,
self-determined) dynamics, as evidenced, amongst other things,
by the fact that most of the brain’s energy expenditure is directed
toward this intrinsic or “resting” activity (Raichle, 2006).
Concluding Remarks
Our analysis offers a naturalistic means of establishing the
existence of systems: wholes that are unified dynamically. As
such, it can help to dispel concerns arising from various boundary
problems that stem from the notion of consciousness being
a measurable quantity. As noted earlier, much of its promise
is predicated on future development, or rather coming into
fruition, of computational approaches to studying experience,
such as the Integrated Information Theory or the Geometric
Theory of consciousness. Even so, discussing prospects for a
solution adds to our conviction that some day it will be possible
to understand consciousness fully in a perfectly naturalistic
framework, no more and no less so than any other fundamental
phenomenon.
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